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Themost lasting legacy of the Soviet experience, more so than institutions that persist in the
Russian Federation today or the mentalities of citizens of post-Soviet states, was its trans-
formation of Eurasia from a rural continent into an urban one. Particularly after the Great
PatrioticWar, the landscape of Soviet urban spaces changed as countless rows of low-quality
apartment housing sprung up and a uniform socialist urban culture appeared to be forming.
However, how and why this urban revolution happened, and what effect it had on the
psychologicalmakeup of Soviet citizens, remains lesser known.Meanwhile,while scholars of
urban history such as Jane Jacobs, Reyner Banham, Lewis Mumford, and Mike Davis have
produced fascinating tracts and monographs on the “ecologies” of American urban spaces –
how, in otherwords, human beings in various political systemshave interactedwith the built
urban landscape around them – limited work has been done on similar processes and
histories in theSovietworldbeyond the technical literatureof theColdWarera. In thispaper, I
attempt to provide the outlines of such a history with such an approach by analyzing how
changes in the Soviet urban fabric from approximately 1932 to 1980s affected social life in
Soviet cities andamongSoviet families. Basingmyargumentonclose readingsof Soviet books
on gradostroitel’stvo (urban construction, urban studies) as well as literature, and guided by
the insights of the above-listed urbanist thinkers, I argue that changes in urban planning so
altered the relationship between citizens, the Party, and History that the Soviet system lost
key strengths that had emboldened it during the 1930s and 1940s. In particular, while new
Soviet housing projects obviously raised the standard of living of a great portion of the
population, in resolving thehousingproblem, theyalsodismantled the “stranger’s gaze” – the
everyday urban clashes that, enabled by denunciations and an efﬁcient and brutal NKVD –
that had dominated Soviet housing until then. Focusing on Magnitogorsk in the 1930s and
a variety of newSoviet cities (Navoi, Dneprodzherzhinsk, etc.) tomake this point, I argue that
the Soviet system, in effect, built itself out of existence by building so much into existence. I
also point to the possibility of rich transnational comparisons in this ﬁeld in the future.
Copyright  2012, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.arch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, HaMore than destroying Hitler’s armies, competing for
superpower status with the United States, or even creating
the most literate society in the world, the Soviet system
transformed Eurasia from a rural continent into an urban
one. What had in 1913 been the Russian Empire, a country
wherepeasants outnumberedurban residents bymore than
two to one, was by 1987 a Soviet empire where urbanites
outnumbered rural dwellers by more than seven to one
(Naselenie SSSR, 1980, p. 12). As the industrial city ofnyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Tatarworker there “hadnever seen a staircase, a locomotive,
or an electric light” before his arrival in Magnitogorsk, for
“his ancestors for centuries had raised stock on the ﬂat
plains of Kazakhstan” (Scott, 1989, p. 16). And in the 1950s,
Soviet towns became perpetual construction sites as cranes
erected thousands of khrushoby apartment buildings;
between 1955 and 1964, the nation’s housing stock almost
doubled from 640 to 1182 million square meters (Hosking,
1993, p. 353). The most lasting legacy of the Soviet system
was not institutions like the Russian FSB or statelets such as
Transnistria, but the archipelago of cities imposed on what
had for all of human history been peasant lands.
These new Soviet cities that rose from the Russian Plain
and Eurasian Steppe like Magnitogorsk, Dzerzhinsk, and
Angarsk were often explicitly constructed as “socialist
cities,” as centers of a socialist civilization. As one Uzbek
book had it, “the construction of new socialist cities was
one of the speciﬁc conditions for the liquidation of the
existing backwardness of Uzbekistan and its transition to
socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development”
(Zhukhrintdinov, 1982, p. 2). There was only one problem:
no one knew what socialist civilization was. If we want to
understand how the Soviet system conceptualized and
tried to build socialism, then a focused way to do so is to
ask the question: what do shifts in the Soviet urban
experience tell us about the changing ideas of what
socialist civilization was? This essay is an attempt to
answer that question by comparing life in Magnitogorsk
and other 1930s Soviet cities with Soviet urban life after
thewarwith a particular focus on the new Khrushchev and
Brezhnev-era housing units. I am more interested in the
urban and residential life of working people than in how
the Soviet elite lived. A close comparison of the Soviet
cities of the 1930s and those of the latter half of the 20th
century will show that the logic of postwar Soviet cities
changed the relationships between individuals, the Party,
state, and History so that theways of “living socialism” that
had made the system strong in cities like Magnitogorsk no
longer existed or were severely weakened. The Soviet
system built socialism out of existence by trying to build
socialism into existence.
In order to see how the urban design of postwar cities
destroyed the social fabric that had made the Soviet system
strong, I examine pre- and postwar cities through three
areas of analysis. First, I compare the construction of
Magnitogorsk with that of postwar cities: what was the
point of building such cities? Second, I compare Magnito-
gorsk with postwar cities as resettlement projects: how did
people come to these cities risen from the ground, how did
their lives change there? Third, I compare the living spaces
of prewar and postwar Soviet cities: where and how did
people live, and how did residential structures lend
themselves to manipulation by residents and local
authorities? I then devote some space at the end of the
essay to respond to three possible objections to my argu-
ment as well as to my overall approach.
In approaching postwar Soviet this way, I aim
throughout to ask what it was in the prewar urban land-
scape that made the Soviet system strong and to analyze
how the postwar socialist urban landscapeweakened theseinstitutions and practices that had made the Soviet system
strong. Given the number and variety of cities in the Soviet
Union, I have elected to argue my points more generally
through examples from literature, history, and ﬁlm rather
than through a focused case study of one or two Soviet
cities. At the same time, I attempt to provide as much city-
speciﬁc analysis as possible through the visual materials
that accompany this essay.
In focusing on gradostroitel’stvo, Soviet urban ecologies,
and by trying to place this all into a comparative context, I
seek to speak to current trends in the historiography of the
USSR. On the one hand, if questions of Soviet nationalities
policy and, before that, high politics and political biography
dominated much of the scholarship of the Soviet Union, in
recent years scholars, under the inﬂuence of the so-called
“spatial turn,” have turned more to examine what has
been called Russia’s imperial geography of power (Adams,
2010; Baron, 2007; Buckler, 2007; Cvetowski, 2006;
Rittersporn, Rolf, & Behrends, 2003; Rolf, 2006, 2010;
Schlögel, 2003; Schlögel, Schenk, & Ackeret, 2007). Often
drawing on distinctions between “public spheres” and
“private spheres” across societies, they pose the question:
how, throughout history, have Russia’s rulers devised
methods of rule – whether in law, economic planning,
ethnography, administrative divisions, or urbanism – to
exercise their sovereignty across an enormous continental
space? (Burbank, von Hagen, & Remnev, 2007). On the
other hand, other groups of scholars, more commonly
associated with Central Asian Studies, have sought to place
Russian Imperial and Soviet history in comparative inter-
national context in order to isolate precisely what made the
Soviet experience unique (Burbank & Cooper, 2010; Edgar,
2004; Khalid, 2007; Kotkin, 2001b; Morrison, 2008;
Northrop, 2004). And still Soviet urbanism remains a rela-
tively underexplored topic among these trends (Evans,
2004).
Given the history of rich, informed, theoretically
sophisticated scholarship on the history of urbanism of
other regions, this represents a real loss. Throughout the
latter half of the twentieth century, many intellectuals
turned their attention to the unprecedented American
suburban, exurban, and, later, posturban landscape
emerging across the country, seeking to situate its rise in
a universal history of cities (Baudrillard, 1988; Eco, 1986;
Jacobs, 1961; Koolhaas, 1978; Mumford, 1961; Scott, 1988;
Sessen, 1991). If authors like Vladimir Paperny have drawn
some attention to the logic of Stalinist urban planning, the
great Soviet urban projects of the postwar years, while
featuring a rich contemporary Russian-language architec-
tural and technical literature, still lack their LewisMumford
to interpret them (Paperny, 1985). Likewise, if Paperny’s
recent idiosyncratic Mos Angeles has contemplated the
possibility of comparing American and (post-) Soviet
metropolises, it remains an outlier in a literature that has
seen limited attempts to situate Soviet urbanism in an
international comparative context (Paperny, 2009). While
the present essay does not yet seek to place Soviet
urbanism into an international comparative context, I hope
that in analyzing Soviet urban spaces as urban ecologies –
built spaces in which citizens derived, grew, or rejected
certain values in interacting with and living in the built
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toward future studies of the postwar USSR.
I turn, ﬁrst, to the construction of these two types of
socialist cities, prewar and postwar. As concerns Magnito-
gorsk, what stands out is how the idea of constructing
a socialist city out of nothing captured the imagination of so
many. John Scott’s 1942 Behind the Urals provides a good
insight into the idealism of those who came to Magnito-
gorsk during the period. The doctor, for example, whom
Scott describes in the book saw the construction of Mag-
nitogorsk as a testament to the superior strength and will
of workers to that of their former capitalist masters. Com-
menting on the fact that neither industry nor the Tsarist
Government “had ever undertaken to project a Ural-
Kuznetsk metallurgical base,” the doctor draws the moral:
“too large and difﬁcult for the capitalists, the task was left
to theworkers.” (Scott,1989, p. 63). In the doctor’s view, the
conquest of the steppe becomes, more than just a practical
matter, a means through which Soviet workers can assert
their identity as subjects and not objects of history. The
doctor’s language supports this view. He describes the
construction of a Ural metallurgical base not as a choice
made by theworkers but rather as a task “left to” them, as if
the construction of metallurgical facilities were a historical
necessity waiting to be realized by the right actors. Even if
one ﬁnds this reading of the Magnitogorsk doctor in a book
that speaks of the “historical issues at stake” in Russian
history a stretch, it is clear that for Scott Magnitogorsk was
less a mere city than a new society in which every worker
had a real investment (Scott, 1989, p. 61). “I was,” wrote
Scott, “going to be one of many who cared not to own
a second pair of shoes, but who built blast furnaces which
were their own” (Scott, 1989, p. 5). Scott saw in the city notFig. 1. A sketch depicting “new cities” (novye goroda”) in the USSR such as Dnepr
Amur. From Planirovka novykh gorodov (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1984), 12.just “a magniﬁcent plant built” but also “much sweat and
blood, many tears” (Scott, 1989, p. 6). The construction of
Magnitogorsk, as Scott saw it, was nothing less than a battle
of total mobilization:
In Magnitogorsk I was precipitated into a battle. I was
deployed on the iron and steel front. Tens of thousands
of people were enduring the most intense hardships in
order to build blast furnaces, and many of them did it
willingly, with boundless enthusiasm, which infected
me from the day of my arrival (Scott, 1989, pp. 5–6).
The point here is that many saw the construction of
1930s Soviet cities not on its own terms but as a world-
historical mission or the realization of utopia. When
Joshua Kunitz witnessed the building of Stalinabad in the
Tajik SSR, this scholar of literature took care with his words
as he described the event as a “Gargantuan task” (Kunitz,
1935, p. 241). He was right: as the graphic from the 1980
book The Planning of New Cities on the next page shows, the
construction of Soviet cities like Navoiy in the Uzbek SSR,
Karaganda in the Kazakh SSR, or Norilsk and Magnitogorsk
in the Russian SSR was an affair largely conﬁned to the
steppe. Settlers like Kunitz, Scott, and Sluchak, a Belorussian
Jew from Gomel come to administer the construction of
Stalinabad, had arrived at the frontier. Andmany of them, as
Kunitz suggested, had found their own earthly Abbey of
Thélème in these construction sites in the steppe (Fig. 1).
But if the construction of the Soviet cities of the 1930s
invited comparisons with Rabelaisian utopias and the
promise of “world-historical lives,” the construction of
postwar Soviet cities inspired only ridicule and criticism. As
pre-fabricated housing shipped in on trucks replaced the
hard-won shelters from the elements that surroundedodzerzhinsk, Sumgait, Brezhnev, Tolyatti, Nadym, and Komsomolsk-on-the-
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tion ceased to be gripping. The animated introduction to
the popular 1975 Soviet ﬁlm Irony of Fate, for example,
depicts a Soviet architect who seeks approval for an
attractive residential complex, but each layer of bureau-
cracy strips away design features until his ambitious
project is reduced to a nine-story variant of the standard
ﬁve-story khrushchovka (Ironiia sud’by, 1975). The bestiary
of regulatory stamps hypnotizes the architect; he becomes
an architectural Napoleon. He marches around the world,
wearing a bicorn made of newspapers as he honks out
orders for khrushchovki to be built everywhere – on bea-
ches, in the ocean, at ski resorts, and in the desert, with zero
concern for site-speciﬁcity. Soon, armies of fully built
khrushchovki wearing army boots march into the sites and
make themselves at home. It would be hard to argue that
these building sites were places where “everything was full
of thrills and romance” (Kunitz, 1935, p. 235). While the
Magnitogorsk doctor, John Scott, and Kunitz’ Tajik
acquaintances believed that they were building a civiliza-
tion ex nihilio, Irony of Fate suggests that the installation of
pre-fabricated housing actually destroys the “placeness” of
a place. The very ﬁrst lines of the ﬁlm describe this process
of construction as destruction that befell the villages-cum
khrushchovki sites surrounding Moscow whose names
inspired future constructed cities:
The villages surrounding Moscow – Proparevo, Cher-
manovo,Medvedkovo, Belyayevo, Bogorodskoye, and, of
course, Cheremushki – did not suspect that they could
discover immortality in those same sorrowful days
when they were forever wiped off the face of the earth
(Ironiia sud’by) (Fig. 2).
Irony of Fate may be a comedy ﬁlm, but it derives its
popularity from its insight into the absurdities and
contradictions of later Soviet architecture. By the 1950s
and 1960s, indeed, Soviet architects and city planners
seem to have lost the conﬁdence that their architectureFig. 2. Culturally-speciﬁc housing? Still from Ironiia sud’by: ski vacarepresented a new and ascendant civilization. A compar-
ison of the construction strategies of Stalinabad and the
postwar city of Navoiy, both in the Uzbek SSR, is illustra-
tive: while contemporary observers of the construction of
Stalinabad boasted that it was the only capital city in the
world, let alone “the dark depths of Asia,” with no church,
mosque, or synagogue, the designers of Navoiy’s central
plaza diluted their architecture with Uzbek inﬂuences.
Where had the conﬁdence in socialist civilization gone?
(Kunitz, 1935, p. 243). This sentiment also found expres-
sion in the October 1988 Lithuanian Sajudis Program,
which demanded “implementation of a housing
construction policy which would correspond to the
cultural and historical traditions of Lithuania” (Furtado &
Chandler, 1992, p. 149). These demands reﬂected resent-
ment toward the imposition of Slavic culture on the Lith-
uanian SSR, but they also spoke to the deﬁcit of
imagination in postwar Soviet civilization building. If
standardized socialist housing failed to capture the imag-
ination as part of a new and better civilization, then it had
no right to exist (Figs. 3 and 4).
Yet more than vessels for the imagination, Soviet cities
were part of a resettlement project that would give the
world’s ﬁrst socialist society an urban proletariat and turn
the scions of steppe-dwelling families into urbanites. Or
were they centers of a new, more consumerist socialist
civilization? Just what the point of people moving to cities
was changed greatly in the Soviet Union from the 1930s to
the Khrushchev and Brezhnev era. In the case of Magni-
togorsk, John Scott summed it up when he described the
city’s population in 1933 as “Communists, kulaks,
foreigners, Tatars, convicted saboteurs, and a mass of blue-
eyed Russian peasants” (Scott, 1989, p. 92). The socialist city
was, in Scott’s view, a place for rural inhabitants of Eurasia
to take part in a pageant of modernization. For some, like
the Tatar Shaimat Khaibulin, whose “life had changedmore
in a year [at Magnitogorsk] than that of his antecedents
since the time of Tamerlane,” (Scott, 1989, p. 19) or fortion interrupted by the construction of “socialist civilization.”
Figs. 3 and 4. “National in form, socialist in content,” or a betrayal of socialist civilization? The central plaza of Navoi, Uzbek SSR. From Planirovka novykh gorodov, 27.
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Tver, the move was voluntary (Scott, 1989, pp. 120–121).
For others, like Shabkov, a former Russian kulak sentenced
to ﬁve years’ time at Magnitogorsk, it was not (Scott, 1989,
p. 18). And yet the move to the city represented the chance
for incredible social mobility (Khaibulin and Masha), to
learn how to read (all three), to learn integral calculus
(Masha), or even to “expiate one’s crimes in honest labor”
(Shabkov) while taking part in the construction of a utopia,
where “we’ll all have automobiles and there won’t be any
differentiation between kulaks and anybody else.”
Consumerist dreams (automobiles) may have played some
role in individuals’ hopes for the future of the Soviet city in
the 1930s, but these desires were subordinated to a larger
narrative of generational mobility and participation in
a historic event.
By the 1960s and 1970s, however, a majority of the
Soviet population had settled in cities, and the spirit of
mobilization and generational mobility had been replaced
by complacency and consumerism. It is true that postwar
projects like the Virgin Lands Campaign, the kukuruza plan,
and even the deployment of “liquidators” to Chernobyl
mobilized tens of thousands of Soviet citizens across Eur-
asia. Unlike Magnitogorsk, however, these “harebrained
schemes” failed to remake the steppe in a meaningful way
(4million hectares of destroyed Kazakh land aside), or were
prompted by other catastrophes (famines and the Cher-
nobyl disaster) (Hosking, 1993, pp. 357, 478). At the sametime, new technologies like tape recorders and X-ray plates
and a lack of restrictions on consumer culture meant that
Western icons from Levi’s Jeans to schlock rock bands could
compete for the time and imagination of Soviet citizens
(Kotkin, 2001a, p. 43). Gone were hermeneutical debates
about the national question in Marxism-Leninism; in were
grafﬁti wars about the merits of punk music versus heavy
metal (Kunitz, 1935, p. 220). People had more of a stake in
what brand of jeans they wore than in the kind of civili-
zation they were to build (Kotkin, 1995, p. 184). And it was
getting harder to link Western culture with militarism or
racism, as was par for the course at Magnitogorsk’s cinema.
How was even the most talented propagandist to discredit
bootlegged Deep Purple LPs? (Dimitry Medvedev has
stated that Deep Purple was among his favorite bands
growing up in Leningrad in the late 1970s and early 1980s.)
Increased ownership of television sets and refrigerators
unhinged peoples’ expectations from those of their parents’
generation. The most striking thing, for example, in M.F.’s
letter to Argumenty i fakty is not that an engineer failed to
ﬁnd an affordable apartment but rather that he felt that he
had the right to own a dwelling he had not built with his
own hands (McKay, 1991, pp. 7–8).
Construction site, resettlement project: Soviet cities
were both of these and more, but most basically, they
were living spaces. Here, too, the shifts in Soviet urban
design reveal much about the growing weaknesses of the
Soviet system. The crowding of Soviet living spaces in the
Fig. 5. The gaze of the stranger eliminated, with separate spaces for work,
leisure, and sleep. “Zhilaya komnata v odnokomnatoi kvartire dlia semye na
triokh chelovek,” Entsiklopedia domashnovo khoziastva, c. 1960s.
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Zoschenko wrote in his 1925 “The Crisis” of a family of
three forced to live in the bathroom of an already-
crowded apartment (Zoschenko, 1963, pp. 137–140) and
in the same year Vyacheslav Shishkov wrote “The
Divorce,” in which a divorced couple has to continue to
sleep in the same bed for want of spare housing
(Shishkov, 1964, pp. 143–148). But the crowding of Soviet
living spaces was no laughing matter. As total strangers
were forced to live with one another, disputes and cruelty
were common. “Every wretched little sign of civilization –
a radio, plumbing, the telephone, the bath, electricity,
everything created for a little comfort, is transformed by
the tenants into a weapon of torture with which they
torment and hound each other to death,” wrote a former
communal apartment dweller in a ﬁctional account
(Kotkin, 1995, p. 479). A Soviet émigré interviewed on
communal apartment life said that divorcees, in an effort
to force their ex-spouse out of the living space, often
organized “very noisy, smoky, and drink-ﬁlled” parties,
and “if the ex-wife had by that time not yet decided to
move out, the man would bring in women” (Geiger, 1968,
p. 209).
And yet the real tragedy of the common space was not
this “loneliness of being together” (odinochestvo vdoem) but
rather the way the Soviet system, at least under the lead-
ership of Stalin, turned these grudges into a form of
government (Akhmatova, 1934). Jan Gross’ study of the
Soviet occupation of eastern Poland is telling. As several of
the testimonies from occupied voivodeships show, the real
power of the Soviet system came from its placing the
instruments of terror at the hands of anyone with a dispute
to settle. In the words of one inhabitant of the region,
“whoever had a grudge against somebody else, an old feud,
who had another as a grain of salt in his eye – he had a stage
to show his skills, there was a cocked ear, willing to listed.
Posters encouraged people to bring denunciations” (Gross,
1988, pp. 119–120). One major source of power for the
Soviet system, however, was not just its placing the secret
police at the hands of individuals with petty grievances (as
Gross argues) but also the crisis atmosphere that sur-
rounded Soviet housing well into the 1950s and that itself
fueled and stoked these grievances. This was the ironic
power of the Soviet system: the failure of the regime to
solve the housing question was itself a success. The more
crowded, annoying, and uncomfortable Soviet housing
was, the more grounds for denunciations there were. Lust
for a neighbor’s spouse, envy on the job, or jealousy of
a colleague’s fur hat existed outside of communal apart-
ments, of course, but was it not easier to denounce
someone who chopped wood in common areas, who stole
windows from the kitchen in a freezing climate, who
“reeked intolerably of cats?” (Bulgakov, 1968, p. 117).
By replacing its old living spaces with more individual
apartments the Soviet system liquidated its own source of
power. It is true that the Soviet regime under Khrushchev,
Brezhnev, the gerontocrats, or even Gorbachev never really
solved the housing crunch in the Soviet Union, but
improvements had been made: letters like Zamsha’s from
Rostov on the Don complain less about smelly strangers
than about the fact that single parents were entitled to onlya one bedroom apartment (McKay, 1991, p. 10). This may
seem like a small difference, but themore the Soviet system
housed its citizens with family members rather than total
strangers and granted them more living space, the more it
did away with the obnoxiousness of communal life from
which it had derived much of its power. The amount of
living space per person had improved, after all. The amount
of living space per person in Magnitogorsk ranged between
1.9 square meters in 1931 to 3.89 square meters in 1935,
and never did this ﬁgure rise about 4 m per person in the
decade (Kotkin, 1995, p. 161). By the late 1980s, however, L.
Alyoshina in Makeyevka was splitting a 41 square meter
three-room apartment with her child, her exhusband, and
his parents, or 8.2 square meters per person (McKay, 1991,
pp. 8–9). More than that, however, the more people lived
with family members, the more they blamed their griev-
ances about living space on the government rather than
their living mates. Gone was Sharikov (of Heart of a Dog)
threatening to shoot his ﬂat mates over his right to sixteen
square arshin (about twelve square meters) and the days of
residential kto-kovo (Bulgakov, 1968, p. 117); in was V.A. of
Tomsk claiming in Argumenty i Fakty that the state-declared
right to nine square meters of living space was a lie and
neighbors making jokes about Brezhnev at the kitchen
table (McKay, 1991, p. 10) (Fig. 5).
This argument has wide-reaching implications for how
the Soviet system functioned. More impressive than the big
KGB of the 1970s and 1980s that assigned 50 agents to one
poet were the smaller secret police empires of the Stalinist
years that had no need for so many agents because of their
armies of upravdomy. Likewise, while it is true that there
existed a paucity of physical spaces for organized opposi-
tion in the Soviet Union compared to, say, Poland, a country
that enjoyed a more lively anti-Communist opposition
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Brezhnev’s drool at the kitchen table or the bar – common
in the late USSR – were trivial compared to meetings at
Catholic churches and Flying Universities, but the real point
here is not that the new Soviet spaces were ill-suited for
organized socialist opposition but rather that they were ill-
suited to generating the “loneliness of being together” that
the Soviet system had thrived on. It is true that the 1960s
and 1970s saw mental hospitals ﬁll up with members of
Helsinki Watch Groups, but the fact that the regime now
relied on medical “professionals” like Dr. Lunts rather than
apartment-dwellers to quell dissent showed how things
had changed (Hosking, 1993, pp. 424–425). These “rein-
forced-concrete nightmare houses,” as one Soviet citizen
charitably put it, may have wasted 50 million tons of steel,
they may have cost the Union 700 billion rubles (the same
as the war), but they put walls in front of that jealous and
cruel “stranger’s gaze” that had dominated Soviet resi-
dential life to that point (McKay, 1991, pp. 120–121; Kotkin,
1995, p. 157). Indeed, even within the home, the move was
to put up more walls. Soviet architectural reformers in the
1950s increasingly concerned with byt (roughly, daily life)
proposed that even the living room of one-bedroom three-
person apartments, like the one pictured below, be divided
into several spaces for work, entertainment, and sleep. The
stranger’s gaze, so important to the Soviet system, had been
blinded.
Now that I have laid out my case for an urban-centric
analysis of the Soviet system, I want to respond to three
possible objections. The ﬁrst is that my analysis underrates
the role that “socialismwith a human face” played in under-
mining the system. In fact, the arguments I have offered about
Soviet urbanism supplement and complicate, rather than
contradict, this narrative. I agree that reform socialism was
destabilizing; half-censorship was near-impossible in the
Soviet system. People inevitably wanted more freedom until
communist monopoly was found illegitimate.
However, to this I would add that “socialism with
a human face” was liquidationist, not only for this reason,Fig. 6. The family of a senior metal worker relaxes in their new Stalin-era apartm
todokumentov, SSSR, no. 0226794, in Victor Buchli, “Khrushchev, Modernism, and t
of Design History, Vol. 10, no. 2, (1997), 161–176.but also because it failed to understand how a spirit of
salviﬁc construction, total physical mobilization, social
mobility, and living spaces, too, were central to the Soviet
system. Not shock workers going to build one of theworld’s
biggest steel mills, but 200 million people watching the
1989 Congress of People’s Deputies on television; activism
not through taking a bullet in the chest and going on to
liquidate kulaks in Ukraine, but through complaining in
Argumenty i fakty about the local Communist Party ofﬁcial
cheating in dog shows: this was the world of socialismwith
a human face (McKay, 1991, p. 42). Idealism, not cynicism,
may have been widely held in the Soviet Union under
Khrushchev and Brezhnev, but there was a difference
between the idealism of the 1930s and the 1960s. The
former thought one had to build socialism while the latter
thought one could legislate it or watch it on TV (Fig. 6).
Another possible objection to my essay is that my argu-
ments about the destruction of the stranger’s gaze rely on an
oversimpliﬁcation of residential life under Stalin. All of my
analysis of domestic life, the objection would go, assumes
that overstuffed barracks and kommunalki were the only
forms of residential life under Stalin in the USSR; the resi-
dential life of Magnitogorsk, one might assert, was an
atypical case in Soviet history. One could point out that in
some ways domestic architecture was more comfortable
under Stalin than under Khrushchev: while some Stalinist
kommunalki tolerated the existence of a central stolovaya
(dining room) that was decorated as such and permitted
communal meals, the apartments of the Khrushchev-era
often did away with the dining room, permittingmeals only
in kitchens that in cases had only fold-down tables. The idea
here is that Stalinist residential architecture and regulations
permitted its inhabitants some modicum of control over
their life (in the decoration of the dining room), while
architecture under Khrushchev sought to destroy any sense
of mealtime ritual, forcing Soviet citizens to tie their food
consumption to its production by eating in the kitchen.
While I cannot object that this theory was true in some
cases, such as that pictured below, I do not think this isent in Voronezh, June 28, 1948. Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Archiv Kinofo-
he Fight against “Petitbourgeois” Consciousness in the Soviet Home,” Journal
Fig. 7. Khrushchev-era kitchen with foldaway table. Entsiklopedia
domashnovo khoziastvo, 1962.
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amount of primary sources suggest that residential life
under Stalin was indeed crowded and cruel. What did byt
even mean to the twelve families living in 40 square meter
dugouts in the Kirov mines? (Zubkova, 1998, p. 103).
Khrushchev-era architecture may have sought to collapse
the dining room into the kitchen, but had not Stalinist
architecture and communalization already forced the
collapse of one family’s entire living space into a communal
bathroom? (Zoschenko, 1963, pp. 137–140). “Eat in the
bedroom, read in the examination room, dress in the
waiting room, operate in the maid’s room, and examine
patients in the dining room”: this, as the Moscow housing
agents in Heart of a Dog explain to Philip Philippovich, was
what byt meant in even the best of Moscow housing in the
era of Stalin (Bulgakov, 1968, pp. 26–27). The increasedFig. 8. Undated photo of the central square of Pripyat, Ukrainian SSR and the Pala
residents of Pripyat.emphasis on byt in the 1950s may be an interesting story,
but this argument is too clever for its own good (Fig. 7).
Still another objection to my essay, this one more
methodological, is that I have not focused enough on the
actual layout of Soviet cities. I concede that for reasons of
space, the scope of this essay, and the available primary
sources, my focus has been on the construction, settlement,
and habitation of Soviet cities rather than their design.
Indeed, I could have written an entirely different essay on
thedifferences in layout between the core of, just to take one
example, Magnitogorsk and Pripyat, a city built in the
Ukrainian SSR in 1970. The spatial relations ofMagnitogork’s
core reﬂect those of power in the city at the time: “aweighty
factory administration, a lofty party administration, and
a lowly soviet, situated around a central square that was
presided over by Stalin,” all while the NKVD building looms
over the entire scene from its perch atop a hill nearby. As
StephenKotkin rightly points out in his analysis of the space,
“the layout and architecture of Magnitogorsk’s administra-
tive agencies expressed a complicated system of authority
[.] all three organizations existed in an uneasy relationship
with each other” (Kotkin, 1995, 289).
And what dominates Pripyat’s central square, itself bereft
of a monument not only to Stalin but also to Lenin? Not the
city soviet but a department store; not the Chernobyl Atomic
Energy Complex administration but the Palace of Culture
“Energy”; not the NKVD but a hotel. And if the numerous
sketches of the townmadeby former residents are true, there
was not even an ofﬁcial KGB ofﬁce anywhere in town, either.
The landscape of postwar Soviet cities shows indeed how
much theSoviet system liquidated socialismbyattempting to
build it. From Solihorsk in the Belorussian SSR to Dne-
prodzerzhinsk in the Ukrainian SSR to Algarsk near Lake
Baikal, there are dozens of examples I could have analyzed in
this way. As even this quick comparison of Magnitogorsk and
Pripyat shows, analyzing the spatial organization of Soviet
cities can be a productive analytical tool, but I chose not to
take that route in this essay because of the general scope of
the assignment and the dearth of technical sources available
on any one particular city (Figs. 8 and 9).ce of Culture “Energetic.” From www.pripyat.com, a website run by former
Fig. 9. The geography of authority of Pripyat: the Palace of Culture and its arcade dominate the square, framed by the Univermag (on the left) and a hotel on the
right. From www.pripyat.com.
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mid 1950s, reﬂecting on her reactions to Stalin’s death. “I
don’t know, but perhaps it was this – it was with him that
we won the war, with him that we built so much” (Boffa,
1959, p. 38). Constructing a new non-capitalist modernity
on top of the idiocy of rural life was amajor goal and–as this
woman realized–accomplishment of the Soviet system, and
yet this quest failed. It failed because Soviet planners and
architects, to say nothing of the housing needs that the
“defeat in victory” of the Great Fatherland War presented,
turned city building from a world-historical task into
a practical one. It failed because the incredible social
mobility that Soviet cities had brought one generation of
former Eurasian steppe dwellers made the next generation
more complacent about what they owed the Soviet system,
and because the appearance of both Western and Soviet
consumer goods changed peoples’ idea of civilization from
a just city into Levi’s jeans and Nike basketball shoes. And it
failed because much of the Soviet system’s power stemmed
from the chaos, cramming, and stranger’s gaze of prewar
housing, and because the prerequisites for a totalitarian
state were liquidated by postwar housing.
And yet while both Magnitogorsk and postwar Soviet
cities corresponded to the dreams and housing needs of
their own times, the lessons on power that the construc-
tion, settlement, and dwellings of these two kinds of cities
have to offer are timeless. From the Republic to More’s
Utopia to modern planned cities like Levittown, Brasília,
and Chandigarh, this quest for the ideal planned city had
deep roots that still grow. The Soviet system failed indeed
to produce a non-capitalist urbanmodernity that enhanced
the system’s strengths, but the problems this quest for
socialist civilization ran into are less a cause for celebration
than a lesson bequeathed by the Soviet project to all great
powers present and future.References
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